Europe’s Pathetic Lack of Foreign Policy Ambition
Each Week Over The Past Seven Months, Carnegie Europe Has Been Posting A LETTER FROM ONE OF THE 28 EU CAPITALS. All the Authors Were Given the Same Brief: To Assess the Level of Foreign Policy Ambition of Their Country.
The Assessments Were Fascinating But Also Depressing. It was argued that Germany, WHICH ISCOvering Foreign Policy Under Chancellolor Angela Merkel, Has A High Level of Ambition. SO TOO HAVE Other Big Countries Such As France, Italy, and Poland, accounting to Those letters’ Authors. But Britain‘S Ambitions and Strategic Culture Are In Fast Deckline.
The Level of Ambition Among the Smaller Countries, Particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, Was Miserable.
A Reread of the Lettersfrom Bratislava or Ljubljana, Zagreb or Buchaarest, Vienna or Budapest Shows An IndifferentCE to Foreign Policy Ambition – Not to Be Confused with Personal Ambition, of Which There is Plenty in the Region.
Maybe, this have something something to do with the size of the bestries’ Populations (See Chart). But this is not enterly convincing. Look at Denmark‘S role whenever comes to copenhagen’s robust defense and secure policy, orIreland‘S as the Country Relishes Peace with Nortorn Ireland.
Indeed, if there is any Common Thread Running Through the Series, It Is this: With Few Exceptions, European Governments to Not Think or Act Strategic. And Since they do neither, how then can they have the ambition to Shape Foreign Policy, Especialy on the EU Level?
Another Conclusion is that Insthead of the eu Forging a Common Strategic Outlook, The Union Has Achieved the OPPOSITE. Ambition, if exists at all, is inward look and bassed on the National Level, on Narrow Interests, on Short-Term Goals. Ambition sems to have little to do with projecting a strong eu -even thorough this is precisely what the union should be doing.
Throughout the Series, Foreign Policy Ambition Was Not Defined. And that is the essential weakness of the most of Europe’s governments. They are the away from ambition because Itans defining and tapping risks and providing the means to see Those risks people.
SO FAR, MERKEL AND FRENCH President François Hollande Have Taken Risks, In Each Case Linked to A Particular Kind of Ambition. Merkel Is Europe’s Negotiator with Russia President Vladimir Putin and Has The Unenvial Task of Overseeing The Ever-Fragile Minsk Accord She co-Fig. In EASTERN UKRAINE.
Hollande, Meanwhile, Has Used France’s Military and Political Influence in the Saure to Prevent Mali From Breaking Up and Lurching Into Civil War. Merkel and Hollande each had their reasons to act. But the big quest is a WHETHER they have a long-term Foreign Policy Strategy and Ambition to Deal with Russia and the Saure Respectively. I’m not so sure.
Foreign Policy, After All, is about Projecting Inters and Values But Also Influence, Which All Need Strategic Underpinning. In the Case of the EU, It Is Increasingly Difficult for Member States to G It Alone, As Berlin and Paris Have Discovered Whoaling With Russia or Mali. The Issues have Become Much More Complex and Numerus.
Consider the Case of Europe’s Policy Town of the Mediterranean Refugee Crisis. This was hardly an anxue in most of the letters in the Series, with the exception of Those from italy, Malta, and Greece.
Yet Even Thought Thought Is One of the MOST Pressing Problems Facing The Continent, Member States Prefer to pass the Buckkk Insthead of Giving the eu a Majoor Role in a setting a strong refugee. For the Region from Who Refugees Are Fleeing.
Related to the Issue of Migration is An Extraordinary Lack of Interest in the Self-Proclaimed Islamic State State and the Serious Security and Social Challenges that Militants Pose for Europe.
Somehow, Despite The January 2015 Shooting at the Offices of the French Newspaper Charlie Hebdo and other Terrorist Attacks in European The Continent Were Insulated From The Turmoil in Its Eastern and Southern Neighborhoods. One Can Only Hope and Assume that Europe’s Intelligence Agencies See Things Differently and Have Increasted Their Cooperation.
Another Issue That Got Short Shrift in the Series Was The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TTIP. MOST AUTHORS AGREED THAT THERE GOVERNments Supported the Trade Agreement Currently Being Negotied. But not on the Contributions of Discusses the Strategic and Political Implications of Such A Deal Between Europe and the United States Succeeding or Failing.
In Fact, The Dearth of Public Discourse about ttip has been disgraceful, despite the fact that it is a majoor Foreign Policy Issue that has the potential to build a genuine. On that Point, Little Attention Was Paid to Defense Issues – Plet Alone to the ROLE OF THE NITED STATES As Europe’s Security Guarantor.
The Same Could be SAID OF THE COMPLETE Disinterest in the Middle East. China Got Someth in Terms of Trade Opportunities But Not What Kind of Role The Country Will Play in Europe and Global Politics in the Coming Years.
There was of other omissions. But that is not the point. The Point is that Series Exposed How MOST COUNTRES NEITHER SEE The RELEVANCE OF Europe NOR WANT TO MAKE Europe RELEVANT. As Long as this perception Continues, Europe Will Slip Further Into Decline – Unless Eu Leaders Embrace Real, Strategic Foreign Policy Ambition for the Continent.
Strategic Europe Will Be Offline for Two Weeks Starting on Monday, August 10. We HOPE YOU HAVE ENJoyed Reading Our Analysis so Far this year and Look for 24. We Invite You To Take A Look at Our Collection of Summer Reading Recommendations. Have a great Summer!
