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HOW TO DEAL WITH RUSSIA'S WAR IN UKRAINE?

It has been a lot quieter on the front since the Ukrainian Parliament started discussing decentralisation reform. As one of the most important provisions of the Minsk II accords, it was strongly pushed for by Russian officials. The truce, which was called after the agreement was signed in February, was worthless. The current situation is promising, yet talking about peace in Donbass is impossible, as too many questions remain unanswered.

However, military confrontation is only one of the many tools that Russia is using to pursue its goals in Ukraine. There is a wide range of political, diplomatic, economical and other instruments of influence that fall under the concept of hybrid war.

More and more voices in the West are pushing for a return to business as usual in relations with Russia. Kiev is required to take the first step and show that the implementation of the accords from Minsk II is already happening. Constitutional reform, which is pushed by both the West and Russia, boosted waves of dissatisfaction among society. And yet the outcomes of these processes remain unclear.

In this issue of Prism.UA, on the one hand, we are trying to take a deeper look at the hybrid war that

Russia is waging against Ukraine. This is done by Yevhen Magda, author of the book *Hybrid Warfare: Survive and Win*, who argues that the main objective of Russia's actions against Ukraine is not to kill but to demoralize. He presents the many arguments using different tools – from media to energy to history – that the Kremlin is using to weaken Ukraine.

Also, in this second issue we look at the outcomes of the Minsk-II agreements. Vadym Triukhan, the author of the second article, argues that the agreement is a total failure. The only way to stop Russia in Ukraine – not only the short-term military assault but to contain its destructive work generally – requires the full-scale isolation of the aggressor from both Ukraine and the international community. He suggests that Russia can only be stopped by making it pay the price it cannot afford. An international peace conference with the participation of the world's leading countries is needed in order to find irreversible conclusions.

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LATEST MANIFESTATION OF THE HYBRID WAR IN UKRAINE

Yevhen MAGDA

Hybrid warfare is a set of actions of military, informational, diplomatic, economic nature, aimed at subordinating the interests of one state to another, sometimes maintaining formal sovereignty of the victim of aggression. The main objective of the hybrid war is to break the will of the enemy as much as possible. In practice, this means striving not to kill the citizens of the other state, but to completely demoralize them.

Splitting the West

On 23 and 24 July 2015 the annexed Crimea was visited by a delegation of ten members of the French Parliament led by Thierry Mariani. They held meetings with local authorities and talked with residents of Simferopol, Yalta and Sevastopol. In Paris, the visit of the deputies was said to be a violation of international law.

In practice, hybrid war means striving not to kill the citizens of the other state, but to completely demoralize them.

The Security Service of Ukraine has banned the French parliamentarians from entering Ukraine afterwards.

Following the French visit, deputies from the Left faction of the German Bundestag and several members of the Italian opposition Movement of 5 Stars also expressed their intention to visit the Crimea. However, German MPs refused to sanction the visit.

The position of the French and Italian politicians is not surprising, as there is a traditionally strong Russian lobby in both countries. It is therefore no accident that the Russian newspaper *Izvestia* tried to blow up the information from the position of MEP Janusz Korwin-Mikke about the future visit of Polish deputies to Crimea.¹

The Kremlin is actively trying to split/destabilize the Western world, and in particular the European Union, to divide it into the right and the wrong – to take advantage of and exaggerate the social problems (recent farmer protests), to portray a dozen deputies of the French Parliament as an honorary delegation, etc. This goal is reflected in news releases, expert commentary and even the publication of fake books.

In February 2015 the publishing house Algorithm published the book *Nobody but Putin* by *The Guardian* journalist Luke Harding. In August, it became clear that the journalist had nothing to do with the book. It soon became apparent that many other works published by Algorithm (including texts by American journalist Michael Bohm, Edward Lucas, Senior Editor at *The Economist*, and former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger) were also released without any knowledge of the supposed authors. In essence, the texts were unauthorized compilations from various sources, sloppily translated with seemingly-arbitrary abridgements, additions, and repetitions.²

The situation surrounding the investigation of the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over Donbass in July 2014

On 29 July 2015 Russia vetoed the draft resolution of the UN Security Council – it was introduced by the SC of Malaysia – on the establishment of an international tribunal to punish those suspected of bringing down the passenger aircraft. Moscow responded by stating that this was a politically engaged, propaganda move

aimed at shifting the blame onto the Kremlin or the Ukrainian separatists, who enjoy the support of Russia.³

In an attempt to provide a fair hearing, Russian propaganda uses methods which become subjects of ridicule. Hence, in early August a record of a conversation between two people posing as spies named David Hamilton and David L. Stern was published. The conversation starts with stilted greetings, and as the awkward dialogue continues it sounds as if “the spies” are reading from a script. They discuss “preparations” for the operation, which includes the actual destruction of the aircraft using ground-to-air missiles, and the “Plan B” – putting bombs in the aircraft cabin. Now the Russian media is promoting a new theory, which is supposedly confirmed by a new audio recording, that the plane was destroyed by a bomb on it, planted by agents of the West.

“This is nonsense”, said Eliot Higgins, the founder of Bellingcat, an open network for investigative journalism, in an interview with *Foreign Policy*. For more than a year, Higgins and his team from Bellingcat have been engaged in exposing the Russian versions of what happened to flight MH17. They use information from public sources: geolocation data from posts and videos found in the social networks, and satellite images, which allow them to track the route of the BUK in the location before and after the missile hit the plane. Based on data collected by Bellingcat, Higgins argues that, most likely, flight MH17 was hit by a missile from the BUK system, controlled by separatists, with Russian support. “We could not find this amount of evidence in favour of any other versions,” he says.⁴

The struggle for Vladimir the Great

The celebration in Russia of the 1000th anniversary of the death of St. Vladimir is an example of distortion (the Duke of Kiev became the Russian state symbol, focusing on its role in Russian history, forgetting that Moscow did not exist at the time), deliberate glorification of the controversial figure of the duke, the use of his baptism to justify the territorial claims of Russia (Khereson and the Crimea as the “holy” places for the RF). What we see now is an emblematic example of the fights for history, levelling out and forgetting about the initial role of Kiev in certain

¹ <http://izvestia.ru/news/589849>

² <http://meduza.io/feature/2015/08/12/kniga-est-a-avtor-net>

³ The detailed analysis of the falsification can be found here: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/12/propaganda-watch-listen-to-two-russians-badly-impersonate-cia-spies-to-pin-mh17-on-u-s-russian/>

⁴ <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/12/propaganda-watch-listen-to-two-russians-badly-impersonate-cia-spies-to-pin-mh17-on-u-s-russian/>

The Russian Federation wins mainly because it plays without rules.

historical processes. At the same time, it is an attempt to show the generality of the past, a civil society and to have a view of a common future from this point – “We have always believed that Russians and Ukrainians are the same people. I still think this”, emphasised Vladimir Putin.

Appeals to the Soviet past and the world outlook:

“It would probably be more correct to call Vladimir what he called himself, and what he was called by his contemporaries: the Duke of Kiev. With regard to the subsequent events, the Soviet position should be recognised as rather prudent and scientifically verified: the Kievan Rus is a cradle of three nations, Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian, – close but not identical patients, equally deserving of respect”.⁵

Moscow is emphatically positioned as the centre of the Orthodox world:

“It should be noted that the celebration of this significant anniversary also takes place in all the dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church. The most important events of the anniversary year will be held in Moscow on July 26-28. They will be attended by the representatives of all the local Orthodox Churches. However, there will be no joint celebrations in Kiev and in Moscow at this time – as noted by the Russian Orthodox Church, because of the difficult political situation in Ukraine”.⁶ Initiators of the celebrations are not embarrassed by nuances such as the absence of Moscow as a settlement during the baptism of Rus.

Let's note <http://1000vladimir.ru/> – a special portal, which was recently closed down and re-directs you to several other sites. The Russian Federation continues to invest in the information war, creating an alternative agenda. After all, the 1000th anniversary of the death of Vladimir was also celebrated in Ukraine. But even when informing about the campaign of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the portal refers to the Russian sites, thus putting a mark on the bottom “Translation from Ukrainian” and skilfully, in the right spirit, referring to the current political situation.⁷

⁵ http://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2015/07/150728_vladimir_the_baptizer

⁶ <http://1000vladimir.ru/2015/07/28/1000-letie-uspeniya-knyazya-vladimira-v-kieve-molilis-za-mir/>

⁷ The Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church spoke to the people of Ukraine on the occasion of the 1000th anniversary of the death of St. Prince Vladimir // <http://1000vladimir.ru/2015/06/25/svyashhennyj-sinod-ukrainskoj-pravoslavnoj-cerkvi-obratilsya-k-narodu-ukrainy-po-sluchayu-prazdnovaniya-1000-letiya-prestavleniya-svyatogo-knyazya-vladimira/>; <http://1000vladimir.ru/2015/07/28/1000-letie-uspeniya-knyazya-vladimira-v-kieve-molilis-za-mir/>

Permanent media attacks of Kremlin

The overall tone of the representation of Ukraine in the Russian new concern about the extremely negative trends. Many releases and newscasts begin with stories about Ukraine, dedicating two-thirds of airtime to it.

The aim is deterrence.

Methods:

1. Intentionally created stories
2. Using frontmen (often actors) as the heroes of stories (for instance, in stories about events in Mukachevo where they interviewed a representative of Transcarpathian Rusyns, who speaks Russian remarkably well and without any accent).
3. Using comments of “experts” unknown to the general public, or of dubious reputation.

Legal wrangle

The confrontation between Ukraine and Russia in the face of Themis has every chance of becoming one of the most prominent in the history of jurisprudence. The Stockholm arbitration over gas payments looks like the first sign. It is only a matter of time, but for example, Ukraine could file claims against the Russian Federation on the annexation of the Crimea. Russia attempts to be pre-emptive. On 14 August 2015 the Russian gas giant Gazprom stated that they had supplied gas to the Donbass region, which is occupied by pro-Russian militants. The cost of this gas is USD 217 million, but they want payment from the national joint stock company Naftogaz Ukraine.⁸

This approach is also used for other tactics of the hybrid war – it is not clear what the status of the occupied territories is. According to international law, it is the territory of Ukraine, but the Russian Federation calls them “Donetsk People's Republic (DNR)” and “Luhansk People's Republic (LHN)”. At the same time, Gazprom demands payment for gas, as if suddenly returning to the legal status quo.

The Ruthenian Card

Events in Mukachevo (exchange of gunfire during a meeting of representatives of the Right Sector and the adherents of Ukrainian Parliament Deputy *Michael Lanyo*, most likely over a battle concerning the flow of contraband cigarettes) intentionally or unintentionally has provoked attempts to utilise/focus on the re-

⁸ <http://economics.unian.net/energetics/1111631-gazprom-jdet-ot-naftogaza-217-millionov-za-gaz-dlya-okkupirovannomu-donbassa.html>

gional differences in Ukraine. So, for example, the representatives of Ruthenian organizations were involved as experts to comment on the situation (it is quite possible that they were figureheads). The advantage of winning with the “Ruthenian argument” is that it puts additional pressure on the EU. Indeed, if the situation is aggravated in the Carpathians, the hot spot occurs on the western border of Ukraine, directly on the border with the EU.

We should note that the marks of Russia in the Ruthenian movement have been noted over the past few years.

What has changed and what has remained unchanged in the arsenal of the Russian Federation

1. The Kremlin has given up trying to use the “legitimate” President Yanukovich, the more so because he does not conjure up any credibility (for example, the recent Euronews video). Instead, the Rescue Committee of Ukraine, headed by former Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, has emerged in the information domain. It is suggested that this is similar to the creation of the “puppet government” before the invasion of Finland, or “cloning” an independent Ukrainian government during the Ukrainian-Soviet War in 1919.
2. Apparent decline in the role of the “gas beverage”. The winter of 2014–2015 happened to be warm, as a result Ukraine was able to withstand pressure from the Russian Federation, as it used internal resources and reverse supplies. It would seem this dependence on Russian gas has been overcome, but this can only be confirmed after the winter of 2015–2016.

3. We can assume with some certainty that the role of economic pressure and the dependence of Ukrainian manufacturers on the Russian market will continue to decline. This is a natural process of the reorientation of producers on European markets, which, however, takes time.
4. Rhetoric in relation to the Crimea no longer covers the special operation on its takeover. By the anniversary of the annexation, Putin has publicly acknowledged that the Crimea was captured with the help of “green men”.
5. Falsification of information remains unchanged (reducing in quality), lies, denial of the obvious, distortion of facts, attempts to be proactive, and intimidation of Ukraine (the ban on the import of Ukrainian agricultural products, the threat of lawsuits in international courts).

The Russian Federation wins mainly because it plays without rules. None of these tools above is in the Kremlin’s unique creations. Sponsoring or provoking separatism, undermining legitimacy and sovereignty, including through history, economic pressure, manipulation of the church, forming the agenda in a light favourable to itself – these examples can be found in military history. But never before have these methods been applied at the same time on such a scale and with such intensity. It would seem that the modern system of international law excludes this in international relations. Ignoring the law (copyright, national, international), a tolerant attitude to crimes against humanity, lies, misrepresentation and open manipulations threaten to turn bilateral relations into a game without rules. The example of the Ukrainian-Russian war confirms this.

FAILURE OF MINSK II. WHAT NEXT?

Vadym Triukhan

Within a day of the successful negotiations, or so it seemed at the time to the official speakers of all parties, of the Normandy Four and the Contact Group in Minsk, the offensive of pro-Russian illegal military formations on the position of the armed forces of Ukraine over Debalcevo began. As a result, the Ukrainian army, suffering losses in manpower and machinery, abandoned this populated locality, which was strategically important from a military point of view, and retreated to a new defensive line. The battle for Debalcevo was the first, but indisputable evidence nonetheless, that Russia is not going to adhere to the 13-point agreement reached on 12 February 2015 – referred to as Minsk II.

And this in spite of its double legitimisation.

First, on the day it was signed by the representatives of the Contact Group, the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements was approved by the leaders of the Normandy Four, as unequivocally recorded in the Declaration adopted by the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, France and the German Chancellor. Second, on 17 February 2015 the UN Security Council unanimously, on Russia’s initiative, adopted resolution No 2202 on Ukraine, annexed by the document signed in Minsk. It is worth noting by the way, that this is the only agreement since the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, despite the dozens of meetings. Even the initiative for the establishment of a military tribunal to investigate the crash of the Malaysian aircraft MN17 was voted

Sooner or later, in the absence of progress in the search for a comprehensive settlement mechanism, sporadic clashes will escalate into a large-scale bloody war, as a way to achieve the objectives pursued by the Kremlin.

down by Russia, exercising its power of veto.

Thus, in the presence of the political will of all parties involved, as of 17 February 2015, the necessary international legal framework for a political and diplomatic solution to the crisis, inspired by Russia in Donbass, was taken. However, Debalcevo and further developments at the front have shown a lack of desire by Russia to adhere to Minsk II. Over the past 7 months, there has not been a single day without gunfire, military clashes, deaths and/or injuries to hundreds of civilians and military in Donbass or other provocative actions from the Russian side.¹ Key points of Minsk II – the cease-fire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons, exchange of prisoners according to the formula “all for all” – are not fulfilled by Russia.

Meanwhile, attention is drawn to the following two points:

1. a targeted campaign in the Russian media and official speakers accusing Ukraine of disrupting the performance of the Minsk agreements;
2. the attempts of some representatives of Ukraine's European partners to force Kiev to show initiative in unilaterally carrying out other parts of the Minsk II agreement, relating to constitutional reform, elections, amnesty, the socioeconomic situation in the temporarily occupied territories of Donbass. This is the wrong approach and cannot be accepted under any circumstances by Ukrainian society.

Why did this happen? As evidenced by the practice used in settling many other military conflicts, there are three types of circumstances that are necessary to achieve peace:

1. Military defeat (surrender) of the army of one of the warring parties. The First and the Second World Wars are clear examples of such cases.
2. Depletion of resources of both warring parties as a result of an extended military confrontation. The ten-year Iran-Iraq war is a perfect example of this type of circumstance.
3. Effective pressure on all the warring parties, but primarily on the aggressor, by the international community. Termination of the Balkan wars has been achieved precisely because of tougher sanctions and increas-

ing pressure from the US, EU and other civilised countries.

None of the three scenarios above have yet occurred in the crisis initiated by Russia in Donbass. Moreover, Russia has not achieved at least three strategic objectives of its current leadership:

First, it has absolutely no guarantees from any state in the world or any international organisation with respect to the hypothetical recognition of the annexation of the Crimea or adoption of the de facto situation that has developed following the signing of agreements on the accession of the Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation.

Second, the United States refused to enter into talks with Russia on a new division of spheres of influence in the world that would take into account the neo-imperial ambitions of Moscow.

Third, Ukraine is not destroyed, on the contrary – it remains a viable state, capable of, under certain conditions (reforms, consolidation of political elites, support by the international community), becoming a success story of democracy, which in itself provides a threat to the regime of Vladimir Putin.

Currently, if we look at the different scenarios which might develop in Donbass in the short term, two are most likely:

1. the continuation of armed clashes of varying intensity without significant changes in the frontline;
2. an attempt to hold large-scale military offensive operations of powerful groups, mainly consisting of different groups of Russian (mercenaries, vacationers, official staff), and under the command of Russian staff officers, with the aim of seizing large areas of the left-bank Ukraine.

Implementation of either of these two scenarios are not in the national interests of Ukraine as this could inevitably lead to further military and civilian casualties, as well as using considerable resources that are otherwise needed to carry out reforms and modernise the country. However, the first scenario is perfectly acceptable to Russia, and the second, under certain conditions (a well-planned provocation, allowing it to accuse Kiev of escalation), may be regarded by the Kremlin as a way to put pressure on Ukraine and the West, and allow it to assist in the achievement of a “peaceful settlement” with the conditional name of Minsk III, which would be beneficial to the Kremlin.

In the current state of political and diplomatic contacts (between Moscow and Kiev, Moscow

¹ The so-called DNI/LNR (Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic respectively) have no independent role in the conflict, being completely under the control of the Kremlin, and executing the scripts conceived and approved in Russia.

The best option is a full-scale peace conference with the participation of the world's leading countries.

and Washington, as well as key European capitals), the current *de jure* Minsk II and the condition of the armies and economies of Russia and Ukraine, one should not expect either peace or large-scale war in the short term. However, it should also be kept in mind that the state of permanent instability itself may not last forever, and the fighting itself will not stop. Sooner or later, in the absence of progress in the search for a comprehensive settlement mechanism, sporadic clashes will escalate into a large-scale bloody war, as a way to achieve the objectives pursued by the Kremlin.

So what to do next, in a bid to lead Ukraine out of the impasse into which it is pushed by Putin's Russia? For now it is quite obvious that the so-called Minsk II agreement has suffered the same fate as its predecessor Minsk I which ended abruptly after the encirclement of Ilovaysk.² None of the parties performs any single point of the said agreements. At a stretch, it could be said that certain provisions of the document have been partly fulfilled. Thus, there is every reason to confirm the failure of Minsk II and the need for Ukraine to refuse to perform them under any pretext (another attempt of attack, a massive bombardment of the civilian population, etc.).

In order to avoid a large-scale war which will involve large groups of Russian armed forces, there is an urgent need to find a replacement for the discredited Normandy and Minsk talk formats.

The best option is a full-scale peace conference with the participation of the world's leading countries – an initiative announced on 5 August 2015 by the newly elected President of Poland Andrzej Duda. The most comfortable international grounds which would be used for the substantive discussion of this initiative is the 70th session of the UN General Assembly. President Poroshenko has been announced as one of the speakers, and not to take advantage of this opportunity would be unforgivable. Even more so, as the list includes the leaders of the United States, China, Poland, France, Russia and other major countries.

Given the fact that President Putin has not achieved any of his objectives, this is likely to receive a cool reception from the Kremlin (as in the case of the initiative concerning the tri-

bunal). However, the main task of Ukraine is to force Russia to support it in the short term, from 6 months to a year, under the pressure of circumstances. To do this measures have to be implemented on the domestic and foreign fronts.

On the domestic front a strategy to resolve the crisis which has arisen in connection with the aggression of Russia against Ukraine must be developed, approved and implemented. This strategy might be based on the document published on 5 March 2015 to resolve the crisis in the east of Ukraine; the document was prepared by the Coalition of Patriotic Forces of Donbass, which includes 17 public organisations from Donetsk and Luhansk regions.³

This document should be based on the idea of a victory for Ukraine in the hybrid war waged against it by Russia, by using hybrid methods against the aggressor. Key challenges which should be addressed:

- recognition of territories temporarily not controlled by Ukraine, *de jure* occupied by the Russian Federation, with entailing consequences;
- creating conditions for the reintegration of internally displaced persons from the occupied territories;
- cessation of all trade and economic activities with the entities of the occupied territories;
- recognition of DNR/LNR as terrorist organisations and ceasing any contact with their "official" representatives;
- introduction of martial law in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
- introduction of full-sectoral sanctions against Russia;
- changes in public opinion in the occupied territories by creating a loyal system of passes, preferential treatment for entrance to universities, access to medicine, opening of preferential credit lines for the purchase of housing and businesses, providing jobs, etc.;
- creation of a separate ministry or agency responsible for implementation of the strategy, including the work with internally displaced persons;
- other measures of an economic, humanitarian, informational, and other nature, including security.

After the development of this Strategy, the Government of Ukraine would have all the necessary grounds for attracting financial and other resources from international financial institutions and partner countries for its implementation.

² Entrapment of Ukrainian Armed Forces, which had been tasked to liberate the city of Ilovaysk, as a result of the invasion of the territory of Ukraine by more than 4,000 Russian armed forces on the night of 25 August 2015, which changed the balance of power and caused significant loss of personnel and equipment. Link to the detailed report of the Commission of Inquiry of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: <http://ru.tsn.ua/ato/ilovayskaya-tragediya-klyuchevye-tezisy-rassekrechennogo-doklada-genshtaba-468717.html>

³ <http://www.ostro.org/general/politics/articles/465808/>

On the foreign front – a complex of measures aimed at consolidating the international community around the problem of stopping the aggression by Russia, namely:

- collecting and bringing to the attention of the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe and the democratic countries of the world evidence of Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine, and supplies to illegal armed groups of all kinds of Russian weapons;
- documenting and informing the international community of each case of capture of Russian troops, voluntary surrender of representatives of illegal military formations, provocations against the civilian population with the use of weapons prohibited by Minsk II, attempts of offensive operations⁴ like the one successfully resisted by the Armed Forces of Ukraine over Mariupol on August 10, 2015 by going on the offensive.
- increasing diplomatic efforts aimed at ensuring the expansion of economic sanctions and the transition from the personal to the sectoral (energy, chemical industry, engineering, finance), as well as disconnecting the Russian banking system from SWIFT;
- introduction of political sanctions (restriction of international contacts, visits and a ban on participation in international conferences) against the leadership of Russia;

- lowering the level of diplomatic relations as a result of the escalation of the conflict;
- depriving Russia of the right to vote in the UN Security Council.

Every step taken by Russia to escalate the situation in Ukraine should be used as a pretext to increase pressure from the international community. At the same time, Ukraine itself should be at the forefront, the first to introduce more and more new economic and political sanctions against Russia, up to a complete shutdown of trade, economic and diplomatic relations.

Only after bringing Russia to the point where it is can no longer finance the war in the Donbass region, containing the situation in Crimea and Donbass, as well as fulfilling the socio-economic functions of the state in the country, causing considerable discontent among the population, will it be possible to seat the Russian leadership at the table, no matter round or square, for real classic negotiations on a comprehensive settlement of the crisis initiated by the Kremlin. This negotiating agenda should contain issues relating not only to the unconditional resumption of Ukraine's territorial integrity, including the return of the Crimea and Sevastopol, but also the creation of an international legal mechanism (tribunal) to investigate all war crimes and crimes against humanity, return of refugees and internally displaced persons, reintegration and reconciliation, renewal of damaged infrastructure, definition of the scope and schedule of payment of reparations and other issues that must be addressed in order to achieve a comprehensive settlement and lasting peace.

⁴ It involved about 400 fighters, 10 tanks and 10 armoured vehicles.

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Foreign policy expert network "Ukrainian Prism"

The foreign policy expert network "Ukrainian prism" was launched in 2012 with an aim to participate in decision-making process and shaping of foreign policy agenda in Ukraine. The network unites more than 15 like minded people in Ukraine with strong expertise in political science, economics, diplomacy and international relations. Members of this initiative represent independent think-tanks and prominent Ukrainian academic institutions from Kiev, Odessa, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv. Since foundation the experts have issued about 30 policy papers with recommendations concerning relations with neighbouring countries, strategic partner states, and international organizations to respective Ukrainian ministries. In 2014 the Network implemented initiative "Ukrainian informational front" focused on awareness-rising campaign within foreign media about Russian aggressive action in Ukraine.

The Eastern Europe Studies Centre (EESC) is a non-governmental, non-profit organization established in 2006. General aim is to build civil society and promote democracy in Eastern Europe by monitoring and researching political, economic, and social developments in the region, and by developing qualitative analyses of them. EESC organizes conferences, seminars, and round-table discussions regarding issues relevant to civil society and democracy; it trains people in areas relevant to its mission; and it also offers consultations and recommendations to individuals and organizations cooperating with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. EESC specializes in the EU Eastern neighborhood policy.

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