Reassessing the European Neighbourhouse Policy: The Eastern Dimension. A Position Paper from Ukraine
Ukrainian-Eu Relations
The EU and Ukraine Established Contractual Relations in 1994 by Signing The Eu-Ukraine Partnership and COOPERATION AGREEMENT (PCA) Launched in 2003, Both Parties Agreed to Cooperate to Facilite Ukraine’s Access to The EU ‘International Market, Policies and Programs. After the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, European Aspirs of a New Political Elite in Kiev Raised The Level of Bilateral Cooperation: Based On the PCA, The Joint Eu-UKRAINE ACASTION ACATION ACATION ACATION plane. The eu and Ukraine opened negotias on a new enhanced agreement, and after Ukraine was admitted to the wto in May 2008, Progress Was Made on Issues Related to A DEEP and Co). In 2009, The Association Agenda Replaced the Action Plan. A Visa Liberalization Action for Ukraine Was Announced at the EU-UKRAINE SUMMIT IN NOVEMBER 2010, and in 2011 Ukraine Accessed to the Energy Community Treaty.
In March 2012, The EU and Ukraine Initialled the Texts of the Association Agreement (AA) and the DCFTA. However, Ukraine’s Progress on Making Major Structural Reforms and Implementing The Association Agenda Prioritis Remished Below Expection. In December 2012, The EU ReaffirMed ITS Commitment to Sign The AA As Soon As Ukraine Demonstrated Tangible Progress on Addressing Selective Justice and In Implementing Agement. Althugh Ukraine Began to CorrectComings Beghan The Eastern Partnership (EAP) Summit in Vilnius, Ukrainian Authoritities DECIDED TO SUSPEND PREPARATIATIONS FOR SIGNING IN NOVER. To the Dramatic Events of the Political Crisis in Ukraine, the ›Revolution of Dignity‹ and Russia’s Military Aggression Toward Ukraine. Ukraine Signed The AA’s Political Provisions on 21 March 2014 and The Other on 27 June 2014. The Ukrainian Parliament Ratified IT on 16 September 2014, and Sobent. Application of It Relevant Parts on 1 November 2014 and the DCfta Section on 1 January 2016. Work on the Second Phase of the Visa Liberalization Action Plan Began in June 2014.
Durying the ENP Negotias, Ukraine-Eu Relations Were Heavily InfluenCed by the Political Sity. Little Progress Was Made Regarding Structural Democratic Changes or Liberalization Under the EU-Ukraine Action Plan and After, the Association Agenda. By signing the AA, Ukraine Indicated It Will to Embark on the Democratic Path of Value-Based Reforms. A More Ambitious ENP Policy Could Be An Adequate Respense to This Call, Making the Neighbourchood Trulay Stable and Prose.
Differentation
The European Neighbourchood Policy Review Begun in March 2015 TriggerED a major Debate Within of the Community of Ukraine Experts and State Institutions. Althugh they are of figrent Minds with Respect to Sector-Specific Recommendations, The Experts Seem to Agree with The ENP’s Basic Principles and The Eap, that is: Eap Pole. EU Member States and Partner Countries. Differentation, Conditionality, The ›More-Foror-More‹ Principle, Co-Langer and Solidarity Are Core Principles that Should be Applied. At the Same Time, It Is Crucial To Elaborate Tese Principles More Profoundly in Terms of Ambitions and Clear Benchmarks. The ›Differentation action of the Real Aspirs of the Partner Countries, As Well As Their Expectations of Future Levels of European Union› Partnership. Within The Eastern Partnership, Two Groups of Countries have Emerged in Terms of Their Ambitions: The Association Agreement ›Club‹ (UKRAIN Azerbaijan and Belarus).
Ukraine’s Effort to Enhance Relations with the European Union Has Been Very Painful. The aa is a mutual binding Framework, WHICH OBLIGES UKRAINE TO ALIGN with Europe Norms and Standards. Some Experts Estimate that Ukraine will have to align it legislative Base with 350 LEGAL ACTS OF THE EU Durying the AA Implementation Process. Yet is Dificult to Compare Ukraine’s Obligations with The Agendas of Those Partners Who Prefer to Follow Their Own Paths to Building Relations with the EU. In this regard, figrentation suggests the Possibility of ›Different Speeds‹ for Partners Who Have Different Visions Regarding Cooperation with the EU. This Approach is Needed to MainTain the Participation of All Six Countries.
›More for more‹
The ›More for More‹ Principle Should be Oriented to Setting Clear BenchMarks and Indicators for Countries WHO DEMONSTRATE Good Progress to Become Engaged in the Ambitios Pras. Participate in the Enlargement Policy One of the ›Carrots‹. To this end, the enp review could be bassed on the understanding that each partner Country hos the sovereign Right to Choose the Depth and Ultimate Aimate Union. The eu must offer the UMG Associate Countries the Possibility of Increated Practical Integration in the Spirit of ›Everything Except Institutes‹. At Same Time, in Order to Immplement of the Reform of the Programs in Each of Their AAS, These Countries Need Expert and Financial Assistance from the EU.
The ›Solidarity‹ Principle Must in Turn Serve to Generate a Common Responsse to the Common Challenges We Face in the Region – from Economic Cries to Russia’s Military Aggression. At the moment, the Level of Political Association and Economic Integration in the aa Creates a Framework for Ukraine to Immplement Reforms, Provides that All Parts of The Document Athmen Provisions. The Implement Process, WHICH REQUIRES EU SUPPORT, Should Receive Emphasis.
Policy Focus
The areas of Joint Interest Identified in the Consultation Paper Cover MOST OF THE DOMAINS WHERE OUR COUNTRIES ALREADY INTERACTT OR COURLD COOPERATE. WHEN IT WITH UKRAINE, WE CAN CLEARLY DISTINGUISH The Prioritis for Active Bilateral Engase. The New ENP Must Help UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES WITH THE AA IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS, USING the METHODOGY ALRAIDY TESESTED ON CANDIDATES FOR EU Membership. The EU and Ukraine Should Also Forge Ahead with Infrastructure Connections and Enhanced Mobility-with A Visa-FREE REGIME AS ITS INDISPensable Part. In this vein, more attention should be accommodated to the following areas:
StrengThening Ukraine’s Institutional Capacity to Implement The Association Agreement
EU Support for Public Administration Reform in Line with the European Principles of Public Administration and the European Charter of Local Self-Government Should beated Toward Policy-Making, Preparation, Adoption and Execution of Government Decisions on the Basis of Policy Analysis at All Levels of the Public Administration; Setting Up and Ensuring the Effective Function of Political Neutral, Professional Civil Servants; Introduction E-Governance at All Levels of Public Administration; Improving the quality of administratic services for Ukrainian Citizens; Adopting and Implementing laWs that introduce decentralization reforms and Build Self-Government Capacity; Absorbing the Capacity Development of Central and Local Authoritities to Deal with the State Budget and International Technical Assistance Resources; and Providing More Assisance for Implementing Compraciene Anti-Corruption Reforms.
Energy Security
Other Eu Support Should Include: Paying Special Attraction to the Possibilities of Coopeting with the EU Energy Union Initiative with Ukraine to Create The Crucel InfrasTructract. Recognizing Ukraine as part of the General Energy Market Through Application of Relevant Eu Energy Legislation to Minimize Russia ‘ Creating A Multilateral Mechanism for Early Notification Within of the Ukrainian Transit Pipeline System, Using Telemetric Control of The Basic Streams of Energy Resources (Oil and Gas) Procedure if deliveries are halted; Enhancing Transparency of the Energy Sector, Introducing International Financial Reporting for All Energy Companies and Improving Access to Statistical Data; Shifting The Gas Purchases Point for Europe and Ukrainian Energy Companies from Ukraine’s Western Border to Its Eastern; and aligning energy legislation and Practice with the ›Third Energy Package‹. Energy Savings and Efficiency, As Well As Market Regulation of the Energy Sphere, Are Crucial for Ukraine.
Information Cooperation
EU Support is Needed to: Build The Capacity of Independent Media, Especialy Efficiency Business Models; Revise The Current Approach to Constructing the eu’s Image in Ukraine, Expand Tools to Involve Various Target Groups in Society and Strengthan The Information of the VALUSING ASSENCE; Create Alternative Russian-Language Television Channels; ACTIVATE PLATFORMS FOR European Consumers About UKRAINE AND Other Eap Countries and Offer A Range of Media Products on the Political, Economic, and Social Sity in Partner; And Introduce Europe Practices of Mass Media Regulation and Establish Cooperation Between National Regulators.
Mobility and People-To-People Contacts
EU Support Is Also Needed: For A Visa-Free Regime for Ukrainian Citizens’ Brief Visits to the EU; to fully integrate the Country Into the EU’s Education and Research Programs – Erasmus +, Creative Europe and Horizon 2020; to development capacity-building Programs for Ukrainian Civil Society; And Strengthan Capacity and Broaden the Scope of Action in Organizations for Internally Displaced Persons in Ukraine and Facilitis The Delivery of International Humanitarian Assistance.
Trade
In April 2014, Ukraine wasted Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATPS), Meaning that the EU Unilaterally Shiffted or Scaled Down ITS Tariffs for Ukraine Producers. However, This Did Not Positively Influence the Bilateral Trade Balance for Ukraine. Compared with The Previous Year, Ukrainian Exports to the Eu Increasted by Only 2.6 per Cent in 2014. To Create More Sustainable Economic and Social Development Provisions; Reducing the Regulatory Burden for Businesses and Improving the Tax Administration’s Efficiency; Increase transarency and competititivens in Public Procurement by Adhering to the EU Public Procurement Directives; Developing Emergency Mechanisms to Preserve Economic Stability Through Possible Temporiary Resource Support for Ukraine or Tempoury Concessary Terms. ATP Regime) in Case of An Extended Trade Blockade by Russia; Campaigning to Raise the Ukrainian Business Community’s Awareness of Working Conditions Underthe New Economic Realities; Creating Platforms to Communicate With European Partners, Getting Advice On Joering Industrial CHAINS AND PROVIDING ACCESS TO CHEAPER Credit Resources for Small) Introduction The Dcfta Facility, The Joint Financial Tool of the European Commission and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); Developing a comprehenSive strategy to attract investors from eu contries by Taking Advantage of the DCFTA REGIME; and ALLOWING UKRAINE TO BEENFIT FROM INTERNAL EU STRUCTURAL FUNDS, SUCH AS PARTICIPATING IN THE CONNECTING European Facility (CEF).
The Regional Dimination
The Neighbours’ Neighbour
The Eap Initiative Envisaged Russia’s Participation from the Very Beginning, But The Russian Federation Has Ruled Out Such an Option and Demonstrated No Interest in Taking Part. Insthead, The Kremlin used The Partner Countries’ Deeper Relations with the eu as a Pretext to Exert Pressure in Various Ways. Whilast Designing Enp Policy, The EU Could Elaborate Instruments to Mitate Russia to Engage. However, Russia Should First Be Forced to Comply with Eu Demands to withdraw from Ukraine and Restore It Territorial Integrity. The Same Principle Should be Applied in Relations with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), A Political Project of the Kremlin. The eu short not make conCCESSIONS TO RUSSIA REGARDING EXCEPTIONS TO THE TIRD ENERGY PACKAGE IN TERMS OF TRANSPORTATION ROUTS Energy Security for Partner Countries. The joint feasability Study on how the Dcftas with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia Might Impact the Russian Econmy is an example of What Can Be Done in a Trilateral Forral Format. Pressure and Waging Trade Wars.
Security
The eu Actvely Participated in Negotias for a Political Solution to the Russian-Fuelled Conflict in Eastern Ukraine (in Geneva in April 2014, Milan In October 2014, and Minsk in 2014, and Minsk in April 2014. Diplomatic Efforts Should Be Accompanated by Extra Efforts in the Field of Security. The EU Should Review ITS Policy on Regional Presence in Peacekeeping Operations Under The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and Expand the Mandate to the Eastern Neighbourhood. Effective Military-Technical Cooperation Should Be Developed Between the EU and Ukraine, Creating Industrial Clusters to Incorporate Ukraine’s Military Potential Into Joint. COOPERATION USING INSTRUMENTS IN THE FRAMONWORK OF THE COMMON FOREIGN and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CSDP Should be Enhanced to Prevent Threats from Escalated Conflict, ORGANIZED.
Multilateralism
IT SHOULD BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT The MULTILATERAL TRACK WAS PART OF OF THE EAP Policy ‘›Aded Value‹ – and itts Weakest Chain. The Partner Countries’ Political DifferentCes and Levels of Europe Aspiration Appear to Indicate that All the Eap Multilateral Institutes Were Infective, Making Separi. A Multilateral Sub-Track Must Be Provides with The Relevant Institutional Base for Dealing with the Eu and the More ComprehenSive Agenda that Will Follow. A Multilateral Track for Six Countries Needs Additional Instruments to Underpin the Projects of Common Interest. More Attraction Should Be Paid to Creating Communication Platforms for Economic Cooperation Between the Eap Partner Countries Who Have Sigrated the DcTha and Those Who Have the Custers Union. The Political and Economic Base of Such A Format Could Strengthan Contacts in the Eap Region. Additional Resources Should be allocated to a special funex to Support Cooperation Projects Involving Three or More Partner Countries.
By Hennadiy Maksak, Polissya Foundation for International and Regional Studies, Ukraine
This Paper Is A Part of Publication“Reassessing the European Neighbourchood Policy: The EASTERN DIMENSION”,
Friedrich-Iert-Stiftung (FES)
